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Abstract 
 A socio-functional approach to prejudice posits that different out-groups are 
perceived to pose different types of threats to group success by in-group members. These 
different types of threats include physical safety/security threats, economic threats, moral 
threats, etc. Within this framework, each type of threat elicits a different emotional 
response from in-group members. In the current pair of studies, we investigated the 
extent to which Arab Americans and Muslim Americans (Study 1), as well as deaf 
individuals and those with disabilities (Study 2) are attitudinally conflated into the same 
social category by measuring the emotional responses they elicit from participants, and 
subsequently, the type of threat they are perceived to pose to society. Results from 
indicate potential conflation between groups (i.e., Muslims and Arab Americans; Deaf 
individuals and individuals with disabilities). One reason why Americans may conflate 
outgroups could be because they have no intergroup contact. Individual difference 
characteristics such as social dominance orientation (SDO), right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA), and religious fundamentalism (RF) also appear to influence attitudes toward 
different types of threat groups. The influence of subtle attitudes and biases, such as 
ambivalent prejudice and positive stereotyping are considered. Overall, the goal of this 
research is to explore the different emotional reactions elicited by outgroups that are 
perceived to be representative of different types of threat. With this, we hope to gain a 
better understanding of the affective nature of prejudice and the individual differences 
that may help predict these specific attitudes.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Section I. 
 History and Background 
Prejudice refers to the preexisting attitudes toward a person or group of people. 
These attitudes can stem from group stereotypes as well as experiences with group 
members and tend to generalize across the group. Early theories of prejudice focused on 
the motivational factors rooted in evolutionary history by discussing the personal benefits 
gained from derogating some groups while favoring others (Fiske, 2000). Cognitive 
theories, such as social dominance theory, and the influence of right-wing 
authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism, focused on individual differences 
between people that may promote prejudice. These individual difference perspectives are 
rooted in evidence that different types of prejudice tend to co-occur, suggesting that there 
may be reliable personal differences in those who are high and low in prejudice (Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999; Smith & Winter, 2002; Altemeyer et al., 1992). Context appears to play 
an important role as well. Rather than being isolated to certain areas or contexts, 
prejudice occurs all over the world but manifests in different ways due to social, 
historical, and cultural differences (Allport, 1954). 
Groups often become separated in society as it is simply easier to relate to and 
interact with other people like oneself than people of different ethnic groups, social 
classes, or other group indicators. The diversity of humanity requires us to categorize 
people into groups to conserve mental resources, and we tend to separate into those who 
are similar in ethnicity, social class, and other identities. This categorization, however, 
may have negative implications for intergroup relations, including verbal rejection, 
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discrimination, and even physical attack (Allport, 1954). When category distinctions are 
salient, people more strongly identify with their ingroup and more strongly dissociate 
from outgroups. (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In other words, people are motivated to favor 
their own groups over others when in conflict. Identifying with and promoting the 
positivity of one’s own social group, as well as degrading outgroups works to establish a 
secure social identity, and by extension, a secure self-concept. 
Contextual influences on prejudice are apparent in the social environment of the 
United States as well. For example, as laws and policies changed to become more 
inclusive and equal for minority members, it became socially unacceptable to express 
prejudice in blatant ways which lead to a decrease in overt prejudice (Bordens & 
Horowitz, 2013). Rather than reducing prejudice overall, however, this simply changed 
the expression of negative attitudes toward minority groups into subtler or implicit 
expressions (Nier & Gaertner, 2012). A study by McConnell and Leibold (2001) 
demonstrated that those who held more negative implicit attitudes toward Blacks were 
more likely to report more negative social interactions with a Black experimenter 
compared to a White experimenter. These more subtle attitudes hold implications for the 
treatment of minority groups in the real word. For example, even though 
antidiscrimination laws have reduced inequality in the workplace, a study by Pager and 
Western (2012) showed that Black and Latino job applicants were less likely to receive a 
callback or job offer than White applicants.  
 Foundational Theories of Prejudice 
Early theories of prejudice helped to inform us about the influence of implicit 
biases on intergroup attitudes (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Katz & Hass 1988; Gaertner & 
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Dovidio, 1986). Aversive racism focused on the tension caused by not wanting to be 
prejudiced, but simultaneously holding unconscious biases (Fiske, 2000). Subtle 
discrimination allows for people to project their negative attitudes toward minority 
groups while maintaining a positive, non-prejudiced demeanor (Gaertner et al., 2000). So, 
though one may claim to support egalitarian principles, aversive racism suggests people 
may still express racism and discrimination in subtle and rationalizable ways. For 
example, when inadmissible evidence is presented in court, jurors will more likely 
perceive guilt in Black than in White defendants and are less likely to rate the 
incriminating evidence as important in their judgement of guilt for Black than for White 
defendants (Johnson, Whitestone, Jackson and Gatto, 1995). 
        The theory of modern racism focuses on policy beliefs that happen to 
disadvantage minorities. Those high in modern racism tend to have ideological excuses 
for their bias, veiling their prejudice with political beliefs that maintain or create 
inequalities (Fiske, 2000). For example, a modern racist might claim that prejudice and 
discrimination are no longer prevalent in society simply because prejudice now takes on 
more subtle forms than in the past when more overt forms of prejudice were more 
socially acceptable (McConahay et al., 1981; Poteat & Spanierman, 2012). Often, the 
perception of economic threats is what underlies feelings that minority groups push 
themselves into unwanted or unearned positions in society, showing too much force in 
the competition for resources. For example, those high in modern racism tend to be in 
opposition to policies that strive for racial equality, such as Affirmative Action (Awad et 
al., 2005).  
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Ambivalent prejudice relies on beliefs to explain attitudes toward stigmatized 
groups, focusing on two complementary views. Perceptions of warmth and competence 
often shape stereotypes - such as women are warm but not competent (Fiske et al., 2002). 
An ambivalent racist will not only score high in pro-minority attitudes (e.g. pity for 
traditionally disadvantaged minority members), but also in anti-minority sentiments (e.g. 
hostility toward oppositional minority members; Fiske, 2000). Benevolent sexism is one 
example of this as it reflects a paternalistic view that women should be treated as fragile 
and needing protection from men (Good & Rudman, 2010). This ambivalent prejudice 
tends to promote emotions that appear positive, but actually further marginalize the 
group, such as pity and envy. These emotional reactions are subtle and can usually be 
rationalized as attributable to something other than group membership (Fiske, 2012). 
Clearly there are many different and subtle ways that prejudice and discrimination remain 
prevalent in society. The question then becomes not only how these attitudes manifest, 
but how best to promote the reevaluation of harmful prejudgments. 
Intergroup Threat Theory 
It is important to remember that group membership can be vast, including 
defining characteristics such as religion, socioeconomic status (SES), sexuality, race, and 
others. While group membership seems to have positive effects on psychological health 
for members of the ingroup (e.g. self-esteem, belongingness, social support; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986), it appears intergroup relations are often negative (Stephan et al., 2009). 
While group living promotes survival and success for humans, it comes with associated 
costs and risks. Living within and among groups of people means surrounding oneself 
with others who could potentially cause harm to oneself or the group (Cottrell & 
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Neuberg, 2005). To minimize this risk, humans are aware of people could potentially 
disservice the group by presenting threats to the group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).  
In general, more successful groups tend to have higher levels of cooperation and 
reciprocity within the group. These groups tend to be highly attuned to threats to the 
social and political systems that create cooperation within the group and respond 
negatively to these threats and those who pose them (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). From an 
evolutionary perspective, high attention to threats is beneficial as it is better to perceive a 
threat when it is not present than to not perceive a threat when it is present (Stephan et al., 
2009). However, in terms of intergroup relations, this predisposition to perceive threats 
may underlie prejudice toward a number of groups. Intergroup threat theory states that 
outgroups generally are perceived to pose either realistic threats (e.g. threats to one’s 
physical safety or resources) or symbolic threats (e.g. threats to one’s moral beliefs or 
values; Stephan et al., 2000).  
Socio-functional Approach 
The socio-functional approach to prejudice recognizes the different threats (i.e. 
symbolic and realistic) and theorizes that they result in different emotional responses 
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). For example, African Americans are perceived to pose 
realistic threats, and Atheists are perceived to pose symbolic threats (Gervais et al., 
2011a). These different threats result in different emotions – African Americans primarily 
elicit fear, and Atheists primarily elicit distrust. The affective result of prejudice that is 
directed toward the racial group “African American” is thereby distinct from the 
prejudice directed toward the value-violating group “Atheist” (Gervais et al., 2011a). 
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A 2005 study on prejudice toward different groups (e.g., African Americans, 
Christians, gay men; Cottrell & Neuberg) suggested that prejudice may elicit several 
emotional profiles depending on the group in question. These emotional responses often 
depend on the context of one’s imagined or real interaction with an outgroup member. A 
subsequent study by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) provided evidence that preferred 
characteristics of an outgroup member depend on the potential for reciprocal 
relationships. For example, characteristics such as intelligence and predictability were 
differentially considered important by participants depending on the context in which the 
target individual was presented (e.g. when reading about a potential fraternity member, 
intelligence and predictability were considered less important than for contexts where 
those traits may be more important, such as in a study group member; Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2007). 
Other research suggests that stereotypes influence emotional responses to groups 
as well as context. Research suggests that people view immorality as representative of 
Atheists, resulting in distrust toward the group (Gervais, 2014). Belief in God was also 
associated with distrust of atheists significantly more than with general dislike of atheists, 
indicating that disliking a group may miss the complexity of intergroup attitudes (Gervais 
et al., 2011a). A recent study by Cook et al. (2015) suggested that Atheists elicited 
greater disgust reactions than other groups who represent symbolic threats (e.g. 
homosexuals and Muslims). This effect was found to be stronger when participants were 
primed with value threats through a fabricated news story on moral decline (Cook et al., 
2015). 
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Intergroup biases are complex, stemming from competition for resources and 
group categorization. This categorization results in cultural representations and 
stereotypes that influence attitudes toward outgroup members, often in the form of 
perceived threats. Social contexts further complicate intergroup attitudes depending on 
the realm of the imagined or real interaction (e.g. buying a coffee from an outgroup 
member versus hiring an outgroup member as a daycare worker; Gervais, 2011b). 
Though explicit bias is increasingly socially proscribed, implicit biases can still lead to 
specific negative emotions and are channeled in Aversive, Ambivalent, and Modern 
ways. 
Section II. 
Individual Difference Correlates of Prejudice 
Certain individual difference characteristics have been associated with prejudice 
toward several groups. Much literature exists on differences in Religious 
Fundamentalism (RF; Altemeyer et al., 1992), referring to a belief in one absolute 
religious text or teaching; Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Smith & Winter, 2002), 
or the belief that authorities should be followed and resisters punished; and Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994), or the support of the existing societal 
hierarchies.  
One study by Rowatt et al., (2005) suggested that both implicit and explicit 
positive attitudes toward Muslims were negatively correlated with RF, RWA, SDO, and 
anti-Arab racism. A subsequent study investigated the facets of RWA and their 
relationship with RF and attitudes toward Arab and African Americans (Johnson et al 
2012a). RWA aggression surfaced as the strongest predictor for several outgroups over 
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multiple studies, such as African Americans, Arabs, and aboriginal Australians (Johnson 
et al., 2012a). Alongside this, RWA aggression was a better predictor of racism than RF. 
This makes sense when one considers that ethnic outgroups tend to be perceived as 
realistic or safety threats rather than symbolic, or value threats (Stephan & Stephan, 
2000).  
Johnson et al (2011) further attempted to understand the specific role of these 
individual difference characteristics in the relationship between religiousness and 
prejudice toward groups that represent a symbolic threat (e.g., homosexuals) and a 
realistic threat (e.g., African Americans). The findings of this study showed that RF 
better explained the relationship between religiosity and prejudice toward the value 
violating threat group, homosexuals, then did RWA. This stronger relationship makes 
sense since those who are high in RF hold rigid morals and values. Thus, when those 
values are perceived to be threatened by groups representing symbolic threats, RF is a 
stronger predictor of negative attitudes. RWA, however, provided a stronger explanation 
of the relationship between religiosity and prejudice toward the realistic threat group, 
African Americans (Johnson et al., 2011).  
SDO is known to be correlated with prejudice toward many outgroups and studies 
suggest this is true for attitudes toward Muslims and Arab Americans specifically. Most 
of this research, however, focuses on its association with prejudice toward ethnic 
minorities (Sidanius et al., 1994; Reynolds et al., 2001; Rowatt et al., 2005; Sibley and 
Duckitt, 2008). Remember that SDO refers to one’s support of existing social hierarchies 
(Pratto et al., 1994). Hence, with White people sitting at the top of the social hierarchy in 
the United States, it is not surprising that those high in SDO tend to hold more prejudiced 
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attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Based on the concept of SDO, we expect that those 
higher in SDO will hold more negative attitudes toward Muslims as they are not a part of 
the religious majority in the United States (i.e. Christianity). We were also curious if 
SDO would be more strongly correlated with certain emotional reactions over others and 
whether this would remain constant across different outgroups. 
 Intergroup Contact 
One way to reduce the perceived threats between different groups is through 
intergroup contact. According to Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis, increasing exposure 
to different groups reduces negative attitudes. Though contact itself can reduce prejudice, 
certain conditions may lead to stronger effects and more positive outcomes. For example, 
intergroup contact in which people from different groups are working together 
collaboratively, rather than in competition, tends to be more effective at improving 
intergroup attitudes (Allport, 1954). Individual difference characteristics appear to be 
influenced by intergroup contact, as well. In a longitudinal study by Dhont et al., (2014) 
contact with minority groups was associated with a reduction in SDO over time. This 
effect was even more pronounced when contact with the outgroup member was rated as 
higher in quality (Dhont et al., 2014).  
Context may also play a role in effectiveness of intergroup contact. Analyses by 
Hamberger and Hewstone (1997) revealed that those who experienced contact with 
outgroup members in a “friend” context benefited most from the contact (i.e. reduced 
prejudice) when compared with “work” and “neighborhood” contexts. Generalization of 
these positive effects across all members of the outgroup may depend on the salience of 
group membership during the time of the contact. It is understood from social identity 
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theory that increased salience of group membership leads to ingroup assimilation and 
favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the contrary, complete decategorization of the 
outgroup member does not allow for generalization across all members of the outgroup. It 
appears most beneficial that categories be redefined (i.e., as non-threatening), rather than 
dissolved or ignored. The most effective contact is when ingroup and outgroup members 
become members of a superordinate group with which both can identify (Brown & 
Hewstone, 2005). Though there are several conditions regarding what makes contact 
beneficial to intergroup relations, a large body of research suggests that there is much 
merit in communicating and interacting with those different from oneself (Allport, 1954; 
Brewer & Miller, 1984; Pettigrew, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). 
Section III. 
Prejudice Toward Specific Outgroups 
        Muslim and Arab Prejudice. Following the attacks of 9/11, there was a surge in 
hate crimes and prejudice toward Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim in the 
United States (North et al., 2014). Many people expressed being approached or accosted 
in their day- to- day lives (e.g., on airplanes, on their commute to work, in public stores). 
For example, in early March of 2017, a Sikh man was told to “go back to where [he] 
came from” and was shot in his own driveway (Al Jazeera, 2017). Further, feelings 
thermometer ratings were lowest for Muslims as compared to seven other religious 
groups (i.e., Jews, Catholics, Protestants, Evangelical Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, 
Mormons, and Atheists; Pew Research, 2017). The increase in these negative attitudes 
and incidences of discrimination were attributed to the increased feelings of national 
threat following the terrorist attacks with downstream effects on both naturally born and 
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immigrated citizens of the United States (North et al., 2014). With an increase in attacks 
around the world by Islamic radicals, concern is rising for the safety and well-being of 
innocent Muslims who are as far removed from these attacks as their Christian 
counterparts. It is increasingly important to understand the prejudice and discrimination 
that these groups face in hopes of developing interventions that can improve 
communication and understanding between Muslims and other religious groups both in 
the United States and around the world. 
One study by Brown et al. (2013) suggested that mere perceptions of Muslim 
identity may influence attitudes toward people. Researchers looked at cues of foreignness 
(i.e. complexion, dress, and name) and their impact on perceptions of one’s religious 
beliefs (Brown et al., 2013). Surprisingly, complexion showed little influence despite 
other data suggesting that people associate a White complexion with American identity 
and other complexions with foreignness. Names were also manipulated to suggest either 
Western or Middle Eastern identity (i.e. Allen or Mohammed). Results showed that 
Western dress was perceived more positively and Middle Eastern dress more negatively 
regardless of name (Brown et al., 2013). However, “Mohammed” was never rated 
particularly positively regardless of dress, whereas “Allen” in Western dress was 
perceived more positively than “Allen” in Middle Eastern Dress. These findings suggest 
that perceptions of Muslims are largely related to cues of foreignness, such as name and 
dress, which were positively related to prejudice (Brown et al., 2013). This is 
unsurprising considering research that has shown an association between subtle 
prejudice, security and power values, and negative attitudes toward the wearing of the 
Islamic veil (Saroglou et al., 2009). This may have implications for the treatment of 
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Muslims or perceived Muslims based on identity visibility. For example, not only might 
people make assumptions about who is or is not Muslim based on appearance (e.g., skin 
color, clothing) or namesake and treat them accordingly with their beliefs about the 
group, but these groups are also more likely to stand out based on appearance, making 
them easier targets of prejudice than other outgroups, such as Atheists. 
        In another study of almost 200 Christian participants, higher perception of 
symbolic threat was associated with increased prejudice toward Muslims and those 
perceived to be Muslim. These attitudes were especially strong in participants high in 
authoritarianism and fundamentalism (Raiya et al., 2008). These findings not only 
suggested that Muslims are being perceived as a symbolic threat (i.e. threatening 
Christian’s religious values), but that certain predictors may be useful in determining the 
characteristics that promote prejudice toward Muslims (Raiya et al., 2008). 
        Both implicit and explicit attitudes toward Muslims and Arab Americans have 
been associated with certain individual difference variables, including social dominance 
orientation, religious fundamentalism, and right-wing authoritarianism, such that as these 
characteristics become more prevalent, attitudes become more negative (Rowatt et al., 
2005). Further, these patterns indicated that the relationships between these 
characteristics and attitudes toward Muslims and Arabs follow a similar pattern, 
suggesting that both groups are perceived to represent similar threats. One interpretation 
is that these groups are being conflated as one in the same, rather than two distinct groups 
or identities (i.e. religious group or ethnic group). These studies will investigate the 
extent to which each group is perceived as a realistic or symbolic threat based on the 
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emotions they elicit as well as the relationships between those perceived threats and 
individual difference characteristics. 
Wirtz and Doosje (2015) investigated attitudes toward Muslims in the 
Netherlands, and incorporated both integrated threat theory and a socio-functional 
approach to prejudice in their work. Their findings generally supported the hypothesis 
that symbolic threat and negative stereotyping would predict prejudice and social 
distance from Muslims as a function of moral emotions, including disgust, anger, and 
pity. For example, negative emotional reactions were associated with prejudice toward 
Muslims and social distance (Wirtz & Doosje, 2015). Increased social distance is 
problematic when considering evidence that intergroup contact improves attitudes 
between different groups of people (e.g. Allport, 1954; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Hamberger & Hewstone, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). 
Deaf and Disability Stigma and Prejudice. As reviewed above, marginalization 
can manifest in several ways depending on the type of threat different groups are 
perceived to pose. Research on persons with disabilities suggests that people tend to hold 
more prejudiced attitudes toward these individuals and that this prejudice is often rooted 
in resource stress (the tension created when groups compete for limited resources). In the 
case of persons with disabilities, this resource strain comes from the perception that 
persons with disabilities have lower resource earning potential than their non-
handicapped peers. As discussed above, people often react ambivalently or benevolently 
with pity or sympathy (Hazzard, 2001; Naemiratch & Manderson, 2009). Further, SDO 
tends to be higher in those with prejudice toward persons with disabilities (Akrami et al., 
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2006). Recall that SDO refers to one’s level of support for existing social hierarchies. 
Thus, this relationship may be influenced by beliefs that those with disabilities have less 
to offer to society, and thus, belong lower in the social hierarchy.  
The Deaf Community faces similar attitudes. Though about 37.5 million of those 
18 and older report at least some level of hearing loss (National Institute on Deafness and 
Other Communication Disorders, 2016), little research currently exists on perceptions 
and attitudes toward Deaf people. It is unclear whether society views Deaf people and 
people with disabilities as separate groups or adopts deafness as a subset of a larger 
disability group (Golos et al., 2012).  
In the Deaf community, there is a clear distinction between capital “D” Deaf and 
lowercase “d” deaf. Namely, “Deaf” connotes an association with the cultural identity of 
deafness, while “deaf” tends to suggest a more medical or pathological view of deafness; 
a disability rather than a part of one’s identity. For the purposes of this paper, capital 
“Deaf” will be used to reference culturally Deaf, and “deaf” will refer to the pathological 
view of deafness and the general deaf population.  
Most deaf children are raised under a pathological perspective of deafness in 
America. A study by Golos et al. (2012) for example, analyzed children’s books about 
deaf characters and found that in 93% of cases, a pathological viewpoint was taken 
(Golos et al., 2012). With this in mind, it is not surprising that deaf children often grow 
up in hearing households without sign language and are expected to overcome their 
deafness by enduring medical interventions such as surgery and intensive speech therapy 
(Holcomb, 2013).   
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Though the existing research provides some insight into the attitudes that deaf 
people may face, our understanding is still spotty and uncertain. The goal of this research 
is to look more closely at attitudes toward deaf people and people with disabilities with 
an eye toward the similarities and differences in attitudes toward each of these groups. 
We will also investigate the relationship specifically between prejudice toward deaf 
people and individual difference characteristics. Because existing literature suggests 
some parallels between attitudes toward deaf people and people with disabilities, we 
expect that patterns in individual difference characteristics and prejudice will be similar 
between groups. 
Aims and Goals of the Current Research 
This research further investigates the affective manifestations of prejudice in the 
form of emotions and the influence of individual difference characteristics on intergroup 
bias. In these studies, we consider specific affective responses toward outgroups in hopes 
of better understanding how they influence the manifestation of prejudice and 
discrimination. Further, we aim to develop a further understanding of the role of 
individual differences in the way in which people approach, respond to, and form pre-
judgements about outgroups. While exploratory in nature, these studies allow us to 
investigate several facets of prejudice at once and offers many opportunities to explore 
the correlations between attitudes, emotional reactions, and individual differences. More 
importantly, these studies aim to widen the scope of prejudice research to include often 
understudied groups of people. We begin our exploration with an observation of attitudes 
toward both Muslim and Arab Americans. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MUSLIM AND ARAB PREJUDICE - UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 
Introduction 
Today, Muslims are one of the world’s fastest growing religions (Lipka & 
Hackett, 2015), and the Arab American population has been steadily increasing as well 
(Brown et al., 2012). Though these are separate groups, it is not uncommon to hear the 
words “Muslim” and “Arab” used interchangeably in the United States. Outgroup 
homogeneity refers to the tendency to view outgroup members as more similar than 
ingroup members (Judd & Park, 1988). Since it is not uncommon for these identities to 
intersect, people may begin to erase the line between them (Muslim as a religious identity 
and Arab as an ethnic identity). As of 2015, the Muslim population in the United States 
was estimated around 3.3 million, or about 1 percent of the population; this number is 
projected to double by the year 2050 (Mohamed, 2016). Following a similar trend, 
between 2000 and 2011 there was a 47% increase in the Arab American population 
(Brown et al., 2012). As these groups grow, prejudice toward them appears to be rising. 
In 2010 (Morales), about 43% of Americans reported negative attitudes toward Muslims. 
This was higher than prejudice toward any other major religious group, including 
Christians, Jews, and Buddhists. Consistent with this, Muslims are more likely to report 
having experienced discrimination compared to other religious groups (Gallup, 2016).  
It could be that their increase in numbers represents a threat to the White, 
Christian majority. Intergroup threat theory would suggest that attitudes toward these 
groups are formed based on the type of threat the group is perceived to pose (i.e. realistic 
or symbolic). Most often, religious groups are deemed representative of symbolic threats 
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and ethnic groups of realistic threats (Gervais, 2011a; Gervais, 2011b; Johnson et al., 
2011; Gervais, 2014). For example, literature shows that Atheists represent symbolic 
threats whereas African Americans represent realistic threats (Johnson et al., 2011). 
Based on this framework, we would expect that Muslims would represent symbolic 
threats and that Arab Americans would represent realistic threats. The socio-functional 
theory extends on intergroup threat theory and posits that different threat groups elicit 
different emotions (e.g. realistic threats elicit fear and anger, whereas symbolic threats 
elicit distrust and disgust).  
Following this theory, Atheists have been shown to elicit distrust and African 
Americans fear (Gervais, 2011a; 2014). So we might expect that Muslims would elicit 
symbolic threat group emotions (such as distrust) and Arab Americans to elicit realistic 
threat group emotions (such as fear). However, many people associate Islam with 
terrorism and violence. A recent Pew study (2016) showed that when asked which 
religion(s) promoted violence, Islam was the most common answer. This, paired with the 
fact that about half of Americans reported thinking that at least some Muslims are anti-
American, may suggest that Muslims may represent more than just symbolic threats. 
Additionally, a recent study conducted in Germany not only showed that Muslim 
prejudice was associated with symbolic and realistic threats, but also that perceptions 
specifically of terroristic threats (e.g. threats to physical safety and well-being) may 
account for anti-Islam sentiments (Uenal, 2016). Thus, we predict that attitudes toward 
Muslims may reflect perceptions of both symbolic and realistic or safety threats.  
Individual differences may also influence attitudes toward Muslims and Arab 
Americans. For example, it could be that something about one’s religious identity or 
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about the way in which they hold their beliefs changes how they feel toward outgroups. 
Religiosity, or the level of one’s devotion to their religion, is associated with increased 
prejudice, especially toward symbolic threat groups, such as Atheists or homosexuals 
(Johnson et al, 2011; Gervais et al., 2011a). Similarly, social dominance orientation 
(SDO), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and religious fundamentalism (RF) are all 
associated with prejudice toward a number of outgroups as well (Sidanius et al., 1994; 
Sidanius et al., 2004; Reynolds et al., 2001; Dallago et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2011; 
Johnson et al., 2012). This makes sense since religiosity tends to be higher among those 
high in each of these characteristics (Johnson et al, 2011; Johnson et al., 2012). It 
appears, however, that certain characteristics may be better predictors of prejudice toward 
different types of threat groups. For example, RF more strongly influenced the link 
between religiosity and prejudice toward symbolic threat groups whereas RWA more 
strongly influenced of the relationship between religiosity and prejudice toward realistic 
threat groups (Johnson et al., 2011). Thus, understanding individual differences that may 
predict prejudice toward groups representative of different kinds of threats may offer 
insight into how to approach those negative attitudes in people high in these 
characteristics. 
 One way to promote positive intergroup attitudes is through contact. Intergroup 
contact theory suggests that increased positive contact with outgroups improves 
intergroup attitudes (Allport, 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Brewer & Miller, 1984; 
Hamberger & Hewstone, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Brown & 
Hewstone, 2005; Dhont et al., 2014). We were interested to see if this played a role in our 
study. For example, if patterns arose between intergroup contact and individual 
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difference characteristics, might this indicate that certain characteristics or strongly held 
beliefs may be more or less likely to promote prejudice?  
 We had several hypotheses going into this study. First, we hypothesized that 
people would show less feelings of warmth toward Muslims and Arab Americans than to 
comparison religious groups (i.e., Atheists) and racial groups (i.e., African Americans) 
respectively. Second, we expected that emotional responses toward Muslims and Arab 
Americans would mirror each other despite the theoretical framework that suggests 
people will respond differently toward religious and ethnic outgroups (i.e. responding to 
Muslims with distrust and disgust and Arab Americans with fear and anger). Finally, we 
expected that individual difference characteristics (SDO, RWA, and RF) and intergroup 
contact would help predict intergroup attitudes toward groups representative of each type 
of threat. We thought that RF would be more highly associated with prejudice toward 
Atheists and that SDO and RWA would not only better predict attitudes toward Arab 
Americans and African Americans, but also Muslims. We predicted that Muslims would 
be perceived as realistic threats and thus, have similar relationships with individual 
difference characteristics as Arab Americans. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from introductory psychology courses at the 
University of Maine (n = 603; 401 female) in exchange for class credit. Participants’ ages 
ranged between 18 and 48 years (M = 19, SD = 2.99). Data were collected via Qualtrics. 
Materials and Procedure (see Appendix A for full measures) 
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    This correlational study measured several constructs via self-report. Participants 
responded to these questions as a part of a larger participant-pool screening measure. 
Attitudes. After consenting to participate, participants completed a feelings 
thermometer to measure general prejudice toward our groups of interest (i.e. Muslims, 
Arab Americans, Atheists, and African Americans; “Please rate how warm or cold you 
feel toward the following groups;” 0° coldest feelings, 50° neutral feelings, 100° warmest 
feelings), and Cottrell and Neuberg’s (2005) emotional measures for each group (e.g., 
“When I think about Muslims, I feel [fear, anger, distrust, disgust, envy, pity, guilt];” 1-
strongly disagree, 7-strongly agree). Finally, intergroup contact was measured (e.g., 
“How often would you say you interact with someone who is Muslim;” 1-Never, 5-All 
the time). 
Individual Differences Characteristics. Social dominance orientation (SDO) was 
measured using Pratto et al. (1994) 16 item scale. SDO spotlights one’s personal 
investment in social hierarchies or the extent to which one supports the existing structures 
within society as good and necessary (Fiske, 2000). An example item from this scale is 
“This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people were;” and 
is scored a 7-point scale (1-strongly disagree, 7-strongly agree; α = .91). Right-wing 
authoritarianism (RWA) taps into the belief that authority should be obeyed and that 
those who refuse should be reprimanded. This was assessed using Smith and Winter’s 
(2002) measure (e.g., “What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who 
will crush evil, and take us back to our true path;” 1-strongly disagree, 7-strongly agree; α 
= .71). Religious fundamentalism encompasses a strong set of beliefs that there is only 
one fundamental set of teachings about the deity. This was measured using a measure by 
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Altemeyer et al (1992; e.g., “When you get right down to it, there are basically only two 
kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, 
who will not;” -4-strongly disagree, 4-strongly agree; α = .93). 
Demographics. Demographics including age, gender, ethnic and religious 
identification were also measured. 
Results 
Our sample was predominantly White (93.2%) and young (M = 19, SD = 2.99). 
Because of this lack of diversity, ethnic and age differences were not included in our 
analyses. The only notable differences between men and women were in SDO and in 
feelings toward Muslims. Men reported significantly higher levels of SDO (M = 2.78, SD 
= 1.12) than did women (M = 2.37, SD = .95), t (544) = 4.56, p < .001, d = .39. Men also 
reported significantly colder feelings toward Muslims (M = 50.21, SD = 30.56) than did 
women (M = 58.25, SD = 28.58), t (445) = -2.75, p = .006, d = .27. No other significant 
differences emerged between men and women. 
In general, people who were higher in prejudice toward one group tended to be 
higher in prejudice toward all four groups (Atheists, African Americans, Muslims, and 
Arab Americans; see Table 1). This relationship was strongest between Muslims and 
Arab Americans (see Figure 1). Feeling thermometer ratings for Atheists and African 
Americans fit expected patterns: Atheists received relatively low ratings (M = 67.83, SD 
= 28.06) and African Americans received relatively higher ratings (M = 77.43, SD = 
23.19), t (435) = 6.15, p < .001, d = .37 (McConahay et al., 1981; Gaertner and Nier, 
2012; Johnson et al., 2012; Gervais, 2014; Doane and Elliot, 2015). Participants tended to 
hold significantly colder feelings toward Muslims (M = 55.50, SD = 29.66) than Atheists, 
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t (432) = 8.30, p < .001, d = .44, and African Americans, t (447) 16.52, p < .001, d = .74. 
Additionally, people felt significantly colder toward Arab Americans (M = 62.20, SD = 
27.97) than Atheists, t (423) = 3.85, p < .001, d = .20 and African Americans, t (440) = 
13.01, p < .001, d = .59. 
On average, levels of each individual difference characteristic were relatively low, 
falling below the midpoint of our scale (SDO: M = 2.51, SD = 1.03; RWA: M = 3.52, SD 
= 1.06; RF: M = 3.09, SD = 1.32). As expected RF was a strong predictor of general 
prejudice toward Atheists, r (432) = -.46, p < .01, those who were more religiously 
fundamentalist tended to have stronger negative attitudes toward Atheists. Those who 
were more social dominance oriented, however tended to have stronger negative attitudes 
toward African Americans, Arab Americans, and Muslims (African Americans: r (424) = 
-.22, p < .01; Arab Americans: r (407) = -.43, p < .01; Muslims: r (421) = -.45, p < .01). 
RWA was moderately associated with prejudice toward each group as well (see Table 1). 
As expected, SDO was a stronger predictor of Muslim prejudice than RF, z (425) = -4.40, 
p < .01. 
For our analyses, we focused on the emotional responses related to symbolic and 
realistic threats: realistic threat, fear and anger; symbolic threat, distrust and disgust. 
Participants expressed relatively low levels of emotional reactions (see Tables 2.1, 2.2, 
2.3, and 2.4). Emotional responses toward African Americans were as expected; 
consistent with Cottrell and Neuberg’s findings (2005), ratings for pity, guilt, and fear 
were highest (pity: M = 2.16, SD = 1.52; guilt: M = 2.04, SD = 1.47; fear: M = 1.95, SD = 
1.34). Mean ratings for Atheists were also consistent with previous findings with high 
levels of pity, disgust, anger, and distrust (pity: M = 2.38, SD = 1.62; disgust: M = 2.17, 
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SD = 1.44; anger: M = 2.16, SD = 1.40; distrust: M = 2.14, SD = 1.40; Gervais, 2011a; 
2014). 
Muslims were the most feared and distrusted group (Mfear = 2.57, SD = 1.67; 
Mdistrust = 2.73, SD = 1.82) followed by Arab Americans (Mfear = 2.40, SD = 1.55; 
Mdistrust = 2.52, SD = 1.66), t (546) = 3.44, p < .005, d = .11, or distrust, t (545) = 4.29, 
p < .001, d = .12. These emotional reactions toward Muslims were reliably stronger than 
Atheist fear (M = 2.06, SD = 1.33), t (551) = 7.45, p < .001, d = .34, Atheist distrust (M = 
2.14, SD = 1.40), t (545) = 7.88, p < .001, d = .36, African American fear (M = 1.95, SD 
= 1.34), t (552) = 9.75, p < .001, d = .41, and African American distrust (M = 1.93, SD = 
1.33), t (551) = 12.04, p < .001, d = .50. Emotional reactions toward Arab Americans 
were also stronger than Atheist fear, t (550) = 5.37, p < .001, d = .24, Atheist distrust, t 
(544) = 5.43, p < .001, d = .25, African American fear, t (551) = 8.04, p < .001, d = .31, 
and African American distrust, t (549) = 10.33, p < .001, d = .39, (see Figure 2). Muslims 
were also rated the highest for both anger (M = 2.37, SD = 1.68) and disgust (M = 2.20, 
SD = 1.53), followed by Atheists (Anger: M = 2.16, SD = 1.40; Disgust: M = 2.17, SD = 
1.44), Arab Americans (Anger: M = 2.14, SD = 1.46; Disgust: M = 2.09, SD = 1.39), and 
African Americans (Anger: M = 1.69, SD = 1.13; Disgust: M = 1.70, SD = 1.16; see 
Figure 2).  
Relationships between fear, anger, distrust, and disgust toward Muslims and 
Atheists (i.e., religious groups that might be value threatening) were compared with 
emotional reactions toward Muslims and Arab Americans (i.e., a religious and ethnic 
group that might be realistically threatening). Relationships between emotional reactions 
to Muslims and Arab Americans were significantly stronger than relationships between 
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emotional reactions to Muslims and Atheists (see Table 3.1). These results suggest that 
Muslims and Arab Americans represent both value and realistic threats as they elicit 
emotional responses of both fear (realistic) and distrust (symbolic). Correlations between 
these emotional reactions toward Muslims and African Americans were also compared, 
showing that this perception is unique to Arab Americans, and does not appear to 
generalize across other ethnic minority groups (see Table 3.2). 
Multiple regressions predicting prejudice were run for each group. As expected, 
RF accounted for more of the variance in prejudice toward Atheists when controlling for 
SDO and RWA. SDO accounted for most of the variance in prejudice toward Arab 
Americans, African Americans, and Muslims when controlling for RWA and RF. The 
strength of these relationships should be interpreted with caution, however, due to the 
associations between each of these characteristics (see Table 1). Regression models 
indicated that RF accounted for about 22% of the variance in prejudice toward Atheists, 
which remained strong even when including RWA and SDO in the model, β = -.41, t 
(389) = -8.34, p < .001; see Table 4.1. SDO was also a significant predictor, but was 
weaker and accounted for less variance than did RF, β = -.10, t (389) = -2.08, p = .037. 
SDO was the only significant predictor of prejudice toward African Americans, β = -.25, 
t (388) = -4.57, p < .001; see Table 4.2. SDO was the strongest predictor for both 
Muslims, β = -.37, t (385) = -7.24, p < .001; see Table 4.3, and Arab Americans, β = -.34, 
t (374) = -6.77, p < .001; see Table 4.4. RWA also accounted for a significant portion of 
variance in attitudes toward Muslims, β = -.16, t (385) = -3.08, p < .002; see Table 4.3, 
and Arab Americans, β = -.19, t (374) = -3.69, p < .001; see Table 4.4. When accounting 
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for variance in SDO and RWA, RF fell out of the models for attitudes toward Muslims 
and Arab Americans; see Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
Increased intergroup contact was moderately associated with more positive 
attitudes toward all four outgroups (Atheist: r (429) = .43, p > .01; African American: r 
(431) = .29, p > .01; Muslim: r (424) = .28, p > .01; Arab American: r (402) = .36, p > 
.01). Higher levels of SDO and RWA were associated with lower levels of intergroup 
contact for Atheists (SDO: r (517) = -.19, p > .01; RWA: r (533) = .33, p < .01), Muslims 
(SDO: r (517) = -.17, p > .01; RWA: r (532) = -.11, p > .05), and Arab American (SDO: 
r (512) = -.09, p > .05; RWA: r (525) = -.14, p > .01). Higher RF was also associated 
with less intergroup contact for Atheists, r (528) = -.24, p < .01). The only association for 
African Americans was between RF and intergroup contact, r (531) = .09, p < .05. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations (feelings thermometer, RF, RWA, and 
SDO). 
Almost all correlations were significant, p < .01, n = 520.  
Italicized correlations were significant, p < .05. 
Insignificant correlations are bracketed. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD 
1. Atheist -       67.83 28.06 
2. African American .38 -      77.43 23.19 
3. Muslim .46 .53 -     55.50 29.66 
4. Arab American .49 .62 .88 -    62.20 27.97 
5. RF -.46 [-.02] -.18 -.20 -   3.09 1.32 
6. RWA -.30 -.12 -.31 -.35 -.37 -  3.52 1.07 
7. SDO -.25 -.22 -45 -.43 -.30 -.35 - 2.51 1.03 
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Figure 1. Mean rating of warmth toward Atheists, Muslims, African Americans, and Arab Americans. 
Participants felt significantly colder toward Muslims and Arab Americans than toward Atheists and African 
Americans. 
 
n = 520 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations (fear reactions toward outgroups). 
Fear 1 2 3 4 M SD 
1. Atheist -    2.06 1.33 
2. Muslim .44 -   2.57 1.67 
3. African 
American 
.38 .54 -  1.95 1.34 
4. Arab 
American 
.46 .76 .58 - 2.40 1.55 
All correlations were significant, p < .01, n = 555. 
 
 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations (anger reactions toward outgroups). 
Anger 1 2 3 4 M SD 
1. Atheist -    2.16 1.40 
2. Muslim .48 -   2.37 1.68 
3. African 
American 
.48 .54 -  1.69 1.13 
4. Arab 
American 
.52 .75 .57 - 2.14 1.46 
All correlations were significant, p < .01, n = 555. 
 
 
Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics and correlations (distrust reactions toward outgroups). 
Distrust 1 2 3 4 M SD 
1. Atheist -    2.14 1.40 
2. Muslim .43 -   2.73 1.82 
3. African 
American 
.43 .51 -  1.93 1.33 
4. Arab 
American 
.45 .77 .56 - 2.52 1.66 
All correlations were significant, p < .01, n = 555. 
 
 
Table 2.4. Descriptive statistics and correlations (disgust reactions toward outgroups). 
Disgust 1 2 3 4 M SD 
1. Atheist -    2.17 1.44 
2. Muslim .50 -   2.20 1.53 
3. African 
American 
.47 .54 -  1.70 1.16 
4. Arab 
American 
.51 .79 .59 - 2.09 1.39 
All correlations were significant, p < .01, n = 555
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Figure 2. Mean rating of fear, anger, distrust, and disgust toward outgroups. Fear and distrust were the strongest emotional reactions 
toward Muslims and Arab Americans. 
 
n = 555. 
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Table 3.1 Correlations and Fisher’s Z-score. 
Emotion Muslim-Arab 
American 
Muslim-Atheist Z-Score 
Fear .76 .44 8.71 
Anger .75 .48 7.48 
Distrust .77 .43 9.31 
Disgust .79 .50 8.67 
   Mz = 8.54  
All correlations were significant, p < .01, n = 555. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Correlations and Fisher’s Z-score. 
Emotion Muslim-African 
American 
Muslim-Atheist Z-Score 
Fear .54 .44 2.19 
Anger .54 .48 1.35 
Distrust .51 .43 1.71 
Disgust .54 .50 .91 
   Mz = 1.54 
All correlations were significant, p < .01, n = 555. 
 
Table 4.1 Multiple Regression Predicting Atheist Prejudice 
Step β t p R2 Sig. F Change 
Step 1    .22 .000** 
RF -.47 -10.39 .000**   
Step 2    .23 .011* 
RF -.42 -8.67 .000**   
RWA -.12 -2.56 .011*   
Step 3    .24 .038* 
RF -.41 -8.34 .000**   
RWA -.09 -1.80 .072   
SDO -.10 -2.08 .038*   
Note. RF = Religious Fundamentalism; RWA = Right-wing 
Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. 
p < .01, n = 389. 
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Table 4.2 Multiple Regression Predicting African American 
Prejudice 
Step β t p R2 Sig. F Change 
Step 1    .00 .830 
RF -.01 -.22 .830   
Step 2    .01 .087 
RF .03 .46 .644   
RWA -.09 -1.72 .087   
Step 3    .06 .000** 
RF .06 1.18 .238   
RWA -.01 -.24 .814   
SDO -.25 -4.57 .000**   
Note. RF = Religious Fundamentalism; RWA = Right-wing 
Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. 
p < .01, n = 388. 
 
Table 4.3 Multiple Regression Predicting Muslim Prejudice 
Step β t p R2 Sig. F Change 
Step 1    .03 .001** 
RF -.17 -3.31 .001*   
Step 2    .09 .000** 
RF -.06 -1.06 .291   
RWA -.28 -5.25 .000**   
Step 3    .20 .000** 
RF .01 .14 .892   
RWA -.16 -3.08 .002*   
SDO -.37 -7.24 .000**   
Note. RF = Religious Fundamentalism; RWA = Right-wing 
Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. 
p < .01, n = 385. 
 
Table 4.4 Multiple Regression Predicting Arab Americans 
Prejudice 
Step β t p R2 Sig. F Change 
Step 1    .04 .000** 
RF -.19 -3.71 .000**   
Step 2    .11 .000** 
RF -.07 -1.37 .171   
RWA -.30 -5.66 .000**   
Step 3    .20 .000** 
RF -.02 -.33 .739   
RWA -.19 -3.69 .000**   
SDO -.34 -6.77 .000**   
Note. RF = Religious Fundamentalism; RWA = Right-wing 
Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. 
p < .01, n = 374.
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Discussion 
 In the current study, we investigated whether Muslims and Arab Americans faced 
similar types of negative evaluations (i.e., emotions elicited by threat). Consistent with 
our hypothesis, participants reported more negative attitudes toward Muslims and Arabs 
than Atheists and African Americans. Also consistent with our hypothesis, emotional 
reactions toward Muslims and Arab Americans were strongly related, such that people 
who felt fear, anger, distrust, or disgust toward Muslims were likely to feel these 
emotions toward Arab Americans, as well – more than towards other groups. These data 
suggest that there were few differences in people’s threat-based emotional reactions 
toward Muslims and Arab Americans. This is inconsistent with integrated threat theory 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000), which suggests that fear is one of the emotional responses 
stemming from realistic threat perception whereas distrust stems from perceptions of 
symbolic threat. Specifically, realistic threats are generally thought of as represented by 
ethnic groups while symbolic threats are thought of as representative of value violating, 
or religious groups. 
The current results suggest that specific emotional reactions toward different 
types of outgroups (i.e. realistic threat and symbolic threat) may be quite nuanced. 
Specifically, it appears Muslims are not being perceived as uniquely symbolic threats, as 
participants reported relatively high levels of fear - suggesting that Muslims were also 
being perceived as a realistic threat. The distrust response, however, does suggest that, 
consistent with integrated threat theory, Muslims are perceived to pose a symbolic threat 
as well. Conversely, though Arab Americans were perceived as realistic threats based on 
fear responses, it appears they were not perceived as uniquely realistic threats, as the 
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distrust response suggests the perception of symbolic threats as well. This overlap in 
threat perception between religious and ethnic outgroups are likely influenced by 
society’s stereotypes of Muslims and Arab Americans. For example, Muslims are likely 
perceived as realistic threats due to the inaccurate association between Islam and 
terrorism. Arab Americans, on the other hand, are likely perceived as symbolic threats 
due to the inaccurate stereotype that all Arabs are also Muslim. Thus, it appears that 
social perceptions of these groups are more important than the functional role or category 
in which they fit (i.e. racial versus religious group). In other words, the type of threat they 
are perceived to pose may be more important than whether or not the group is religious or 
ethnic in nature. 
Consistent with past literature (Reynolds et al., 2001; Rowatt et al., 2005; Johnson 
et al., 2011; 2012; Ho et al., 2015), we also found that those who were high in social 
dominance orientation (SDO), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and religious 
fundamentalism (RF) held more prejudiced attitudes toward outgroups. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, we found a strong relationship between prejudice toward Muslims and 
SDO, such that as SDO increased, prejudice increased. Further, RF was more highly 
associated with prejudice toward Atheists, consistent with previous literature. Thus, we 
took the strong association between Muslim prejudice and SDO, rather than RF, as a 
further suggestion that Muslims may be perceived as realistic as well as symbolic threats. 
The present study sheds light on the prejudice faced by Muslims and Arab 
Americans. Many past studies have investigated attitudes and emotional reactions toward 
Atheists and African Americans (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 2007; Cook et al., 2015; 
Gervais et al., 2011a; 2014; Johnson et al; 2012), but few exist that examine relationships 
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between Muslim and Arab American prejudice, specifically. Due to the correlational 
nature of this study, more research is necessary to truly understand the implications of the 
emotional reactions toward Muslims and Arab Americans. In study two, we employ the 
same methodology to examine emotional reactions toward Deaf people and those who 
have disabilities, two other groups that are often conflated by society. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AFFECTIVE REACTIONS TOWARD THE DEAF AND THOSE WITH 
DISABILITIES 
Introduction 
Stigmatization can manifest in several ways depending on the group in question. 
According to intergroup threat theory, described above, different outgroups are perceived 
to pose different types of threats. Research on persons with disabilities suggests that they 
are perceived to pose resource threats; for example, threatening the group by placing 
excess burden on limited resources to which they are considered unable to contribute or 
reciprocate (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Another group that may face similar 
stigmatization are the Deaf. Currently, little research examines the stigmatization of Deaf 
individuals and people with disabilities.  
In general, studies have found that participants express prejudice toward people 
with disabilities in both modern (subtle) and classical (blatant) ways (Akrami et al., 
2006). This perception of persons with disabilities as broken or unable often leads to 
responses of pity or sympathy (Hazzard, 2001; Naemiratch & Manderson, 2009). Though 
these responses are seemingly benevolent and well-intended, the negative effects of being 
stigmatized based on one’s group membership are still present. For example, research 
suggests that benevolent sexism where women are viewed as fragile and in need of 
protection can lead to perceptions of lower competency in women that can decrease 
hireability ratings for female job applicants (Good & Rudman, 2010). 
Attitudes toward people with disabilities are also associated with individual 
differences like social dominance orientation (SDO), such that those higher in SDO also 
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tend to hold more negative attitudes toward people with disabilities (Akrami et al., 2006). 
SDO refers to one’s level of support for existing social hierarchies. Thus, the relationship 
between prejudice toward persons with disabilities and SDO may be influenced by beliefs 
that those with disabilities have less to offer to society, and so, belong lower in the social 
hierarchy.  
The Deaf may also suffer from a similar form of stigmatization. Though about 
37.5 million of those 18 and older report at least some level of hearing loss (National 
Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders, 2016), little research 
currently exists on the stigma deaf people face. In the past, the deaf were marginalized, 
commonly referred to as “deaf and dumb” due to their struggle communicating in a 
hearing world. For most deaf individuals, this communication barrier begins in the home. 
Approximately 90% of deaf people are born to hearing parents who do not know 
American Sign Language (Sheppard et al., 2010). Those who were born deaf or lost their 
hearing as infants, often experience little-to-no language input during critical language 
acquisition periods in early development, further exacerbating this communication 
barrier.  
Since most Deaf children are born to hearing parents, an oral approach to 
communication is often utilized in the home. Further, society is predominantly hearing 
oriented, which may lead to the expectation that Deaf children need to acquire and use 
speech to be successful. Most children learn much of their first language through natural 
exposure - hearing their family speaking to one another and giving verbal cues, 
something that Deaf children often miss out on (Hindley et al., 1994; Strong, 2007). It is 
suggested that the lack of exposure to a language of any kind (i.e. verbal or visual) leads 
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to a poorer theory of mind among Deaf children (Sessa & Sutherland, 2013). This lack of 
a reliable communication method may have implications for the mental health of Deaf 
people, including increased emotional problems, low self-esteem, and behavioral issues. 
For example, a study conducted in Australia showed that 39 percent of Deaf or hard of 
hearing children experienced mental health problems, compared to just 14 percent of 
hearing children (Brown & Cornes, 2014). The early age at which mental health 
problems seem to develop in Deaf and hard of hearing children suggests that by 
secondary school, these children are at an increased risk of mental health problems 
compared to their hearing counterparts. 
These negative effects may be further complicated by the different perspectives of 
deafness. The pathological view of deafness, described with a lowercase “d,” refers to 
those who either view the deafness of others or themselves as a disability; whereas the 
cultural view of deafness, described with a capital “D,” refers to one’s identification with 
the Deaf culture, community, and identity (Golos et al., 2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
However, many people are unaware of this distinction. In a study that analyzed the 
illustrations of children’s books with deaf characters, references to the pathological view 
of deaf people comprised 93 percent of cases while the cultural perspective of Deaf was 
referenced in only 7 percent of cases (Golos et al., 2012). This could minimize the 
potential importance of one’s deafness to their social identity, life experiences, and 
worldview. 
As far as we know, a socio-functional approach to prejudice has not been used to 
investigate attitudes toward Deaf individuals or persons with disabilities. Recall that the 
socio-functional approach to prejudice suggests that the expression of negative attitudes 
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may depend on the context or group in question (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 2007). For 
example, people may feel certain emotions, such as fear, toward a stigmatized group such 
as African Americans; or distrust toward Atheists (Gervais, 2011a; 2014). As mentioned 
above, existing research suggests that people feel pity toward persons with disabilities 
(Hazzard, 2001; Naemiratch & Manderson, 2009). Further, it appears most society views 
deafness from a pathological viewpoint, much in the way that disabilities are often 
viewed. Thus, we predict that most people will assume a pathological viewpoint, and 
respond to deaf people in the same way as persons with disabilities (i.e. pity). We will 
explore whether differences in attitudes toward deaf people arise as a function of one’s 
perspective of deafness (i.e. cultural versus pathological).  
Based on what we know about SDO and its relation to prejudice toward persons 
with disabilities, and the fact that those higher in RWA tend to hold more prejudiced 
attitudes, we expect that those higher in SDO and RWA will hold more negative attitudes 
toward each group (Poteat & Spanierman, 2012; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). We also 
predicted that those who reported more contact with members of each group would hold 
less prejudiced attitudes, on average ((Allport, 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Brewer & 
Miller, 1984; Hamberger & Hewstone, 1997; Pettigrew, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Dhont et al., 2014). By observing response patterns 
toward people with disabilities and Deaf people, we hope to further understand the 
perception of Deaf people and persons with disabilities in the United States. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
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Participants were recruited from introductory psychology courses at the University of 
Maine (n = 840; 88.57% Caucasian; 63.45% female;) in exchange for class credit. 
Participants’ ages ranged between 18 and 45 years (M = 19, SD = 2.11). Data were 
collected via Qualtrics. 
Materials (see Appendix B for full measures) 
    This correlational study measured several constructs via self-report. Participants 
responded to these questions as a part of a larger participant-pool screening measure. 
Attitudes. After consenting to participate, a feeling thermometer was used to 
assess general warmth toward groups (“Please rate how warm or cold you feel toward the 
following groups;” 0° coldest feelings, 50° neutral feelings, 100° warmest feelings). A 
seven item Likert scale of emotional measures was also included (e.g., “When I think 
about people with deafness, I feel fear;” 1-strongly disagree, 7-strongly agree; Cottrell 
and Neuberg, 2005). The Attitudes Toward Persons with Disabilities measure (ATPD; 
Katz et al, 1988; e.g., “Parents of children with disabilities should be less strict than other 
parents;” 1-strongly disagree, 7-strongly agree), and an adapted version of the ATPD to 
measure attitudes toward Deaf people was also included (e.g., “Parents of Deaf children 
should be less strict than other parents;” 1-strongly disagree, 7-strongly agree). A 
measure of the tendency to take a pathological versus a cultural viewpoint of deafness 
was developed (e.g., “Deafness is just like any other physical impairment;” “Deafness is 
an important social identity for people who are Deaf;” 1-strongly disagree, 7-strongly 
agree). Finally, intergroup contact was measured (e.g., “How often would you say you 
interact with someone who is Deaf;” 1-Never, 5-All the time). 
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Individual Difference Characteristics. Social dominance orientation (SDO) and 
right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) were measured (Pratto et al., 1994; Smith & Winter, 
2002; Altemeyer et al., 1992). SDO focuses on one’s support of existing social 
hierarchies (Fiske, 2000; “This country would be better off if we cared less about how 
equal all people were”) and is scored a 7-point scale (1-strongly disagree, 7-strongly 
agree; α = .91). RWA measures the belief that authority should be obeyed and that those 
who refuse should face consequences (e.g., “What our country really needs is a strong, 
determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path;” 1-strongly 
disagree, 7-strongly agree; α = .71).  
Demographics. Demographic measures included age, gender, and ethnic 
identification. 
 
Results 
 In general, negative attitudes toward Deaf people and people with disabilities 
were relatively low (Deaf: M = 3.02, SD = .69; Disability: M = 3.34, SD = .58) and 
feeling thermometer ratings were high (Deaf: M = 85.94, SD = 16.84; Disability: M = 
82.32, SD = 18.65). Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that those who hold more 
negative attitudes toward people with disabilities tend to hold more negative attitudes 
toward Deaf people, as well, r (860) = .68, p < .01. Patterns of emotional reactions 
toward each group were also similar; pity was rated highest (Deaf: M = 2.69, SD = 2.03; 
Disability: M = 3.65, SD = 1.95), followed by guilt (Deaf: M = 1.99, SD = 1.57; 
Disability: M = 2.49, SD = 1.75) and anxiety (Deaf: M = 1.81, SD = 1.38; Disability: M = 
2.33, SD = 1.66; see Figure 3). Those who felt pity toward Deaf people were also more 
likely to feel pity toward those with disabilities, r (860) = .52, p < .01, suggesting that 
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people are responding the same way emotionally to people with disabilities and Deaf 
people (see Table 5). Correlations between groups were also moderately strong for guilt, 
r (860) = .67, p < .01, and anxiety, r (860) = .57, p < .01. We expected that those who 
took a pathological perspective of deafness would respond to deaf people the same way 
that they respond to persons with disabilities on thermometer ratings, emotional 
reactions, and on the original and adapted version of the ATPD. Due to a lack of 
reliability in our cultural-pathological view of deafness measure, we were unable to 
observe whether participants took one perspective over the other or if any of our variables 
were influenced by this. 
 Individual difference characteristics, including SDO (M = 3.33, SD = .55) and 
RWA (M = 3.62, SD = 1.14), also played a moderate role in predicting attitudes toward 
Deaf people and people with disabilities. Increased SDO was associated with more 
negative attitudes toward both Deaf people, r (832) = .33, p < .01, and those with 
disabilities, r (831) = .26, p < .01. Correlations between RWA and attitudes toward were 
also similar for Deaf people, r (833) = .24, p < .01, and people with disabilities, r (832) = 
.21, p < .01 (see Table 6). Intergroup contact was observed as a correlate of decreased 
prejudice toward both groups (Disability: r (833) = -.17, p < .01; Deaf: r (818) = -.20, p < 
.01), such that as reports of contact increased, negative attitudes decreased. Levels of 
intergroup contact were low for both Deaf people (M = 1.94, SD = .93) and people with 
disabilities (M = 2.97, SD = .95) which may have played a role in the relatively weak 
relationship between intergroup contact and attitudes. Thus, we urge caution when 
interpreting the influence of intergroup contact on attitudes toward these groups. 
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Figure 3. Emotional reactions toward Deaf people and people with disabilities. Pity 
toward both deaf people and persons with disabilities was significantly stronger than 
guilt or anxiety. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Prejudice and emotional reactions toward Deaf people and 
people with disabilities. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Prejudice - .11 .16 .17 
2. Pity .19 - .45 .38 
3. Guilt .21 .35 - .41 
4. Anxiety .26 .25 .43 - 
All correlations were significant, p < .01, n = 860. 
Correlations for Deaf targets below the diagonal; Correlations for persons 
with disabilities above the diagonal. 
 
Table 6. Individual difference characteristics, prejudice 
toward Deaf people and people with disabilities, and 
contact with Deaf people and with disabilities. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. M SD 
1. SDO -      3.32 .55 
2. RWA .35 -     3.61 1.15 
Prejudice         
3. Deaf .32 .23 -    3.01 .69 
4. Disability .25 .21 .68 -   3.34 .58 
Contact         
5. Deaf ns ns -.20 -.13 -  1.94 .93 
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6. Disability ns ns -.11 -.17 .22 - 2.97 .95 
Most correlations were significant, p < .01, n = 860. 
 
Discussion 
Results indicated relatively positive responses toward both Deaf individuals and 
persons with disabilities on measures of attitudes and feeling thermometers. This may indicate 
that attitudes toward deaf people and people with disabilities have become more positive than 
in previous years. Another explanation may be that these more positive ratings are a result of 
social proscription, or the transition of prejudice from explicit to implicit. For example, many 
laws are in place protecting the rights of those with disabilities (e.g., Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; U.S. Department of Justice, 
2009), thus, admitting to biases based on one’s physical or mental abilities is not only frowned 
upon, but it can have legal repercussions.  
Results showed that prejudice and emotional reactions toward Deaf individuals 
and people with disabilities were associated. This may suggest that people are assuming a 
more pathological view of deafness, perceiving it as a disability, and thus, responding to 
members of this group in much the same way as persons with disabilities. Additionally, 
participants responded most strongly with pity toward both groups. As reviewed above, pity is 
associated with ambivalent prejudice as well as threats to reciprocity in which the target 
individual (i.e. the deaf person or person with disabilities) is unable to reciprocate social 
resources due to no fault of their own (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Thus, these results may 
suggest that both groups are perceived as victims of their pathological "disabilities" and 
perhaps that leads to explicit positive endorsement of that group in the form of positive 
stereotyping.  
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Positive stereotyping is a form of prejudice that encompasses positive 
assumptions of people based on their social group membership. Though they may appear 
positive, these stereotypes still lead to depersonalization (i.e., the feeling of being regarded as 
a member of your social group rather than as an individual), and have negative impacts on 
cognitive and emotional functioning (Czopp et al., 2015). Further, evidence suggests that 
those who endorse positive stereotypes often endorse negative stereotypes as well (Kay et al., 
2013). This may be an important consideration in prejudice research with groups that are more 
socially proscribed such as African Americans and people with disabilities, as it is more 
socially acceptable to positively stereotype groups than to negatively stereotype groups (Mae 
& Carlston, 2005). 
As expected, SDO and RWA both moderately predicted prejudice toward each 
group. This is not surprising as both constructs refer to rigid beliefs about social structure. As 
such, because SDO is associated with increased prejudice, it stands to reason that Deaf people 
and persons with disabilities are perceived as low status groups. The higher incidence of pity 
may further help to explain this low societal standing as these groups likely fall low in the 
social hierarchy because of the perception of them as unable to reciprocate social resources. 
These results are consistent with intergroup contact theory as participants who 
reported more contact with each group also reported lower levels of prejudice (Allport, 1954; 
Brewer & Miller, 1984; Pettigrew, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Though there are many 
facets of intergroup contact that can lead to improved intergroup relations (Allport, 1954; 
Hamberger & Hewstone, 1997; Brown & Hewstone, 2005) in this study, we only explored the 
surface level association between reported contact and prejudiced attitudes by asking 
participants in a single item how much prior contact they had with each group. 
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Though this study offers budding insight into the stigma faced by deaf people and 
persons with disabilities, certain limitations should be acknowledged and addressed in future 
investigations. Based on past research (Golos et al., 2012), we expected that most participants 
assumed a pathological perspective on deafness. Unfortunately, a lack of reliability in our 
cultural-pathological perspective measure did not allow for further investigation on the ways 
in which people perceive deafness and deaf individuals. This lack of reliability may have 
occurred for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it is likely that most people do not even 
consider deafness as an important part of one’s cultural identity. It is also possible that we 
ourselves have an inaccurate view of what a Deaf identity truly consists of, and thus, we may 
not have been measuring the construct we aimed to measure. Future studies geared toward 
developing a reliable measure of the pathological-cultural perspectives of deafness would be 
beneficial in understanding how these groups are being perceived by society, and how these 
perceptions may influence attitudes toward deaf people. 
Further, emotional responses indicate people may be perceiving both deaf individuals and 
persons with disabilities from pathological viewpoints, rather than distinguishing Deaf people 
as their own group with their own culture and identity. Based on this, it may be more 
beneficial to focus on the perception of stigma that deaf people face. In other words, it may be 
better to consider deaf individuals’ perceptions of the stigma their group faces and determine 
the mental health effects of that stigma. Given that many deaf children show more emotional 
health problems earlier on than their hearing counterparts (Brown & Cornes, 2014), it is worth 
determining how much of this difference may be influenced by stigma-consciousness and 
self-stigma. 
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In conclusion, this study provides what we know to be some of the earliest investigations 
of general attitudes and affective responses toward Deaf individuals as well as providing more 
evidence on the affective responses toward persons with disabilities. Though people tend to 
report relatively positive attitudes toward both groups, they are most likely to respond with 
pity, a form of positive stereotyping that may still have negative impacts on the recipients. 
Further, people appear to respond emotionally the same way toward both Deaf people and 
persons with disabilities, suggesting that people may not perceive these groups as distinct 
from one another. This research provides a base from which future work can build to create a 
deeper understanding not only of the stigma that these groups face, but also the consequences 
of said stigma on one’s social identity and mental health.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Both current studies investigated emotional reactions to several outgroups, 
including Muslims, Arab Americans, Deaf people, and people with disabilities. These 
emotional responses were used to infer the type of threat that each group was perceived 
to pose (i.e., realistic or symbolic threat; Stephan et al., 2009). Because symbolic threats 
have most commonly been seen as representative of religious outgroups, and realistic 
threats of ethnic outgroups, (Gervais, 2011a; Gervais, 2011b; Johnson et al., 2011; 
Gervais, 2014), one might expect that Muslims would be perceived as symbolic threats 
and Arab Americans of realistic threats. Study one, however, revealed a more convoluted 
picture in which Muslims and Arab Americans elicited both fear and distrust from 
participants, suggesting that both groups were being perceived as symbolic and realistic 
threats. 
Patterns of prejudice and individual difference characteristics further supported 
this finding. For example, had Muslims been perceived uniquely as symbolic threats, we 
would have expected RF to better account for variations in prejudice, as RF refers to rigid 
religiomoral beliefs. Instead, the role of SDO, a construct related to the endorsement of 
societal hierarchies, was a stronger predictor of prejudiced attitudes toward Muslims than 
RF, a construct related to the endorsement of rigid religious beliefs. This suggests that the 
threats Muslims are perceived to pose are based more on threats to hierarchical status 
than to differences in values and beliefs. This is inconsistent with the implication of 
Johnson et al. (2011) that RF is a better predictor of attitudes toward traditionally value-
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violating groups, such as religious groups, due to the rigid nature of fundamentalist 
beliefs.  
The influence of SDO on attitudes toward Arab Americans is consistent with the 
extant theoretical underpinnings of SDO (Pratto et al., 1995) in which endorse social 
hierarchies – our participants are primarily members of the White majority that make up 
the top of this hierarchy. This may suggest that the relationship between Muslim 
prejudice and SDO is a function of associating Islam with Arabic descent. This aligns 
with previous research suggesting that perceptions of Muslim identity by way of name, 
dress, and complexion, are sufficient to influence attitudes toward people (Brown et al., 
2013). Thus, if someone sees someone of Arabic descent, they may assume that the 
person is also a Muslim, resulting in group conflation. 
In study two, emotional responses toward deaf individuals and persons with 
disabilities were also strongly related. The pity reaction in particular suggests perceptions 
of reciprocity threats, a type of realistic threat that is based on the perception of low 
competence of outgroup members. Consistent with these findings, past research suggests 
that people often react to reciprocity threats with pity or sympathy (Hazzard, 2001; 
Naemiratch & Manderson, 2009). Since intergroup biases often stem from competition 
for resources within society, deaf people and people with disabilities may be perceived to 
strain collective resources by free-riding.  
The strong relationship between pity toward deaf individuals and persons with 
disabilities further suggests that people respond emotionally the same way toward both 
groups, and thus, may not distinguish deaf people and people with disabilities as 
belonging to two separate groups. Additionally, these emotional reactions and the 
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consequent perception of low competence among deaf people and people with disabilities 
suggests that people take a pathological viewpoint, focusing on what these groups are 
unable to do, rather than what they contribute to society. This is consistent with research 
that suggests that deaf children are most often exposed to a pathological view of deafness 
(Golos et al., 2012). More evidence for this perspective was seen in the relationships 
between SDO and negative attitudes toward Deaf people and people with disabilities. 
Based on the definition of SDO, these relationships were likely influenced by beliefs that 
these groups have less to offer to society, and thus, belong lower in the social hierarchy. 
As negative attitudes on the basis of ethnicity or ability become more socially 
proscribed, people become motivated to appear unprejudiced (Plant & Devine, 1998). 
Still, unconscious biases exist, creating tension between groups (Fiske, 2000). People 
may be further motivated to hide their biases due to threat of legal repercussions. Many 
laws now exist to help protect minority groups (e.g., Affirmative Action, Americans with 
Disabilities Act). Thus, prejudice became more implicit, or unconscious. These 
unconscious biases often appear benevolent and well-intentioned, often manifesting in 
pity and guilt (Fiske, 2000; Hazzard, 2001; Naemiratch & Manderson, 2009; Fiske, 
2012).  
Emotional reactions to outgroups may be influenced by evaluations of warmth 
and competence (Fiske et al., 2002). Though we did not directly measure perceptions of 
warmth and competence, it would appear that traditionally “warmer” and “incompetent” 
groups, such as African Americans and persons with disabilities, most strongly elicited 
feelings of pity and guilt. Thus, it may be that warmer and more competent groups tend to 
  49 
elicit more seemingly benevolent emotions (i.e., pity and guilt), while colder groups tend 
to elicit more blatantly negative emotions (i.e., distrust and fear). 
Emotional evaluations also informed the type of threat that each outgroup was 
perceived to pose. As society becomes more diverse, perceptions of threat from outgroup 
members’ increases in both symbolic and realistic ways. Though some research would 
suggest that Muslims, a religious group, would be perceived as symbolic threats (Raiya et 
al., 2008; Gervais, 2011a; Gervais, 2011b; Johnson et al., 2011; Gervais, 2014), our 
results suggested that they may be perceived as realistic threats as well. As groups 
become divided by these threats, group salience may increase and lead to 
overgeneralizations and stereotyping that put more strain on intergroup relations (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). 
While the findings of the current studies offer much explorative insight into 
attitudes toward groups not commonly investigated in prejudice research, the 
correlational nature of these studies does pose some limitations. It is unclear whether any 
cause-and-effect relationships would emerge between emotional reactions, prejudice, and 
individual difference characteristics. For example, we are unable to determine whether 
higher SDO was a driving force of prejudiced attitudes, such that being higher in SDO 
causes people to hold more prejudice toward outgroups. Further, our sample was not very 
representative as it consisted mainly of White college students and may not truly reflect 
the attitudes of the United States population as a whole. 
Perhaps our biggest limitation was the use of explicit measures of prejudice and 
emotional responses. In general, self-reports of negative attitudes and emotions were low. 
Social desirability refers to the tendency to appear non-prejudiced. As laws and policies 
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have shifted to create more equality for minorities, it has become less socially acceptable 
to report having negative attitudes based on group membership (McConahay et al., 1981, 
McConahay, 1986). Thus, asking someone to report their own negative feelings toward 
outgroups may not paint a clear picture of intergroup attitudes. For this reason, the use of 
measures of modern prejudice, implicit measures like the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998; 
Greenwald et al., 2003), or physiological measures like startle reflex (Amodio et al., 
2003) would be ideal to gain deeper understanding of the underlying emotions and 
attitudes toward outgroups. 
Context is another important consideration as it plays a clear role in attitude 
formation. Our study consisted of self-report answers to general questions, rather than 
employing intergroup contact between group members in a setting controlled for type of 
interaction (e.g., constructive, hostile, neutral). In the future, it would be beneficial to 
either have participants interact or imagine interacting with members of the outgroup, as 
research suggests that simply imagining an interaction with a member of an outgroup can 
influence intergroup attitudes (Crisp & Turner, 2009). The context of the interaction can 
also influence attitudes depending on the scenario or task at hand. For example, having 
contact with outgroup members in a “friend” context may be better at reducing negative 
attitudes as compared with a “work” context (Hamberger & Hewstone, 1997). Further, 
contact in which people work together in collaborative ways is more effective for 
reducing prejudiced attitudes as this can lead people to redefine their group categories 
into a superordinate group to which both members belong (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). 
Overall, these studies suggest that people may conflate Muslims and Arab 
Americans, and may do the same with deaf people and people with disabilities.  
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Perceptions of threat appear to underlie this perception of homogeneity of outgroups by 
society. As is true of any correlational study, results should be considered as a precursor 
to further experimental investigations that would allow for the control and manipulation 
of variables such as individual difference characteristics, context, and contact. Still, the 
implications that the current research holds for perceptions of and subsequent 
discrimination toward each of these groups are important and suggest that Muslims and 
Arab Americans, as well as deaf individuals and persons with disabilities, may face 
similar prejudice and discrimination in the real world because of the complexity of the 
threats they are perceived to represent and the subsequent emotions they elicit.
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APPENDIX A: MEASURES AND MATERIALS 
Study One: Muslim and Arab Prejudice – Understanding Our Emotions 
On the below feelings thermometer, please rate between 0 and 100 how cold or warm you 
feel toward each group with 0 being coldest and 100 being warmest. 
______ Atheist 
______ Muslim 
______ Christian 
______ Arab-Americans 
______ African-Americans 
 
When I think about Atheists, I feel... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Fear m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Disgust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Anger m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Pity m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Envy m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Guilt m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Distrust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
 
How often would you say you interact with someone who is Atheist (e.g., friends, family, 
co-workers, community members....) 
m Never 
m Rarely 
m Sometimes 
m Often 
m All of the Time 
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When I think about Muslims, I feel... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Fear m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Disgust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Anger m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Pity m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Envy m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Guilt m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Distrust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
 
Frequency of Intergroup Contact - How often would you say you interact with someone 
who is Muslim (e.g., friends, family, co-workers, community members....) 
m Never 
m Rarely 
m Sometimes 
m Often 
m All of the Time 
 
When I think about African-Americans, I feel... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Fear m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Disgust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Anger m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Pity m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Envy m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Guilt m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Distrust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
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Frequency of Intergroup Contact - How often would you say you interact with someone 
who is African-American (e.g., friends, family, co-workers, community members....) 
m Never 
m Rarely 
m Sometimes 
m Often 
m All of the Time 
 
When I think about Arab-Americans, I feel... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Fear m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Disgust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Anger m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Pity m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Envy m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Guilt m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Distrust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
 
Frequency of Intergroup Contact - How often would you say you interact with someone 
who is Arab-American (e.g., friends, family, co-workers, community members....) 
m Never 
m Rarely 
m Sometimes 
m Often 
m All of the Time 
 
Social Dominance Orientation: 
Show how much you favor or oppose each idea below by selecting on the scale below. 
You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best.  
 
An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Slightly 
Oppose 
Neutral Slightly 
Favor 
Somewhat 
Favor 
Strongly 
Favor 
 
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
 
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Neutral Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
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Oppose Oppose Oppose Favor Favor Favor 
 
No one group should dominate in society. 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Slightly 
Oppose 
Neutral Slightly 
Favor 
Somewhat 
Favor 
Strongly 
Favor 
 
Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Slightly 
Oppose 
Neutral Slightly 
Favor 
Somewhat 
Favor 
Strongly 
Favor 
 
Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Slightly 
Oppose 
Neutral Slightly 
Favor 
Somewhat 
Favor 
Strongly 
Favor 
 
It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Slightly 
Oppose 
Neutral Slightly 
Favor 
Somewhat 
Favor 
Strongly 
Favor 
 
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Slightly 
Oppose 
Neutral Slightly 
Favor 
Somewhat 
Favor 
Strongly 
Favor 
 
We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Slightly 
Oppose 
Neutral Slightly 
Favor 
Somewhat 
Favor 
Strongly 
Favor 
 
Right-wing Authoritarianism:  
Show how much you agree or disagree with each statement below by selecting a number 
from 1 to 7 on the scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best. 
 
Obedience and respect are the most important things kids should learn. 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
People should be made to show respect for America’s traditions. 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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Disagree 
 
We must crack down on troublemakers to save our moral standards and keep law and 
order. 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Religious Fundamentalism: 
Show how much you agree or disagree with each statement below by selecting on the 
scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best. 
 
Everything in our sacred writing is absolutely true without question 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Our sacred writing should never be doubted, even when scientific or historical evidence 
outright disagrees with it 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
The sacred writing is NOT really the words of God, but the words of man 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
The truths of the sacred writing will never be outdated but will always apply equally well 
to all generations 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
The sacred writing is the only one that is true above all holy books or sacred texts of 
other religions 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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Study Two: Deaf or Disabled? A Study of Prejudice and Stigma Toward Deaf 
People and Persons with Disabilities 
When I think about people with disabilities, I feel... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Fear m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Disgust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Anger m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Pity m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Envy m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Guilt m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Distrust 
Anxiety m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Frequency of Intergroup Contact - How often would you say you interact with someone 
with disabilities (e.g., friends, family, co-workers, community members....) 
• Never 
• Rarely 
• Sometimes 
• Often 
• All of the Time 
 
On the below feelings thermometer, please rate between 0 and 100 how cold or warm you 
feel toward each group with 0 being coldest and 100 being warmest. 
______ People with disabilities 
 
Mark each statement according to how much you agree or disagree with it. 
 
Parents of children with disabilities should be less strict than other parents. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Persons with physical disabilities are just as intelligent as non- disabled ones. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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People with disabilities are usually easier to get along with than other people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Most people with disabilities feel sorry for themselves. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with disabilities are often the same as anyone else. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
There should not be special schools for children with disabilities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
It would be best for persons with disabilities to live and work in special communities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
It is up to the government to take care of persons with disabilities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Most people with disabilities worry a great deal. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with disabilities should not be expected to meet the same standards as people 
without disabilities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with disabilities are as happy as people without disabilities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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People with severe disabilities are no harder to get along with than those with minor 
disabilities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
It is almost impossible for a person with a disability to lead a normal life. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
You should not expect too much from people with disabilities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with disabilities tend to keep to themselves much of the time. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with disabilities are more easily upset than people without disabilities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with disabilities cannot have a normal social life. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Most people with disabilities feel that they are not as good as other people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
You have to be careful how you act when you are with people with disabilities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with disabilities are often grouchy. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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When I think about people with deafness, I feel... 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Fear m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Disgust m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Anger m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Pity m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Envy m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Guilt m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
Distrust 
Anxiety m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
Frequency of Intergroup Contact - How often would you say you interact with someone 
with deafness (e.g., friends, family, co-workers, community members....) 
• Never 
• Rarely 
• Sometimes 
• Often 
• All of the Time 
 
On the below feelings thermometer, please rate between 0 and 100 how cold or warm you 
feel toward each group with 0 being coldest and 100 being warmest. 
______ People with deafness 
 
Mark each statement according to how much you agree or disagree with it. 
 
Parents of Deaf children should be less strict than other parents. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Deaf people are just as intelligent as non- disabled ones. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Deaf people are usually easier to get along with than other people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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Most Deaf people feel sorry for themselves. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with deafness are often the same as anyone else. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
There should not be special schools for Deaf children. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
It would be best for persons with deafness to live and work in special communities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
It is up to the government to take care of persons with deafness. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Most Deaf people worry a great deal. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Deaf people should not be expected to meet the same standards as hearing people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with deafness are as happy as people without deafness. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Severely Deaf people are no harder to get along with than mildly Deaf people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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It is almost impossible for a Deaf person to lead a normal life. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
You should not expect too much from Deaf people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with deafness tend to keep to themselves much of the time. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Deaf people are more easily upset than people without disabilities. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with deafness cannot have a normal social life. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Most people with deafness feel that they are not as good as other people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
You have to be careful how you act when you are with Deaf people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People with deafness are often grouchy. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
Mark each statement according to how much you agree or disagree with it. 
 
Deafness is just like any other physical impairment. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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Disagree 
 
Deafness is an important social identity for people who are Deaf. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Deafness is a disability. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Deaf culture has unique perspectives to contribute to society. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
The Deaf community contributes positively to society in a number of ways. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
People who are deaf are not as capable as others in day-to-day life. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Show how much you favor or oppose each idea below by selecting the degree to which 
you oppose to the degree to which you favor on the scale below. You can work quickly; 
your first feeling is generally best.  
 
An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.  
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
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Group dominance is a poor principle. 
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
Group equality should be our ideal. 
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor 
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.  
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose 
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral 
m Slightly Favor 
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
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Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place.  
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose 
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
It is unjust to try to make groups equal.  
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral 
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the 
same chance in life.  
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor 
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
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No one group should dominate in society.  
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose 
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups 
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
Some groups of people must be kept in their place. 
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.  
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor 
m Strongly Favor  
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We should not push for group equality. 
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. 
m Strongly Oppose  
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor 
 
We shouldn't try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of life.  
m Strongly Oppose 
m Somewhat Oppose  
m Slightly Oppose  
m Neutral  
m Slightly Favor  
m Somewhat Favor  
m Strongly Favor  
 
Right-wing Authoritarianism:  
Show how much you agree or disagree with each statement below by selecting a number 
from 1 to 7 on the scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best. 
 
Obedience and respect are the most important things kids should learn. 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
People should be made to show respect for America’s traditions. 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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We must crack down on troublemakers to save our moral standards and keep law and 
order. 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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